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INTRODUCTION
On 24 September the G20 leaders will reconvene
in the North-American city of Pittsburgh for a new
round of talks on economic and financial issues.
Two main questions on the agenda: what (more)
needs to be done to re-emerge from the worst
crisis since the Great Depression, and how global
finance needs to change to prevent similar crises
occurring again. These last two years, as painful
as they have been, leave behind a rich legacy of
experience on how modern financial systems
work and may fail. This is useful in designing a
coherent reform programme, but not enough to
move forward. Behind a web of technicalities,
financial sector reform is an inherently political
process; providing impulse and guidance for
action is the challenge the leaders face in this
important meeting.
In spite of its high stakes, the summit is attracting
little attention and expectations are low. National
debates are concentrated on other issues – health
reform in the US; electoral uncertainty and other
malaises in Europe; the social costs of the
recession everywhere – only indirectly related to
financial reform. Public opinion, though deeply
sensitive to parts of the agenda, is largely
unaware of the upcoming meeting; even
economists are distracted, in spite of their calls to
‘draw lessons from the crisis’. In the financial
markets there is a tangible desire to move on,
restart the music and resume the party. The ‘back-
to-normal’ atmosphere risks extending to policy
circles, where the comfort of routine is always a
temptation. In this context, Pittsburgh may
represent in many ways a last chance; the window
of the leaders’ attention seems about to close, and
the task of financial reform about to move back to
a more technical level.
Between this challenge and their many
constraints, leaders will need to compromise
between ambition and realism. Objectives will
have to be concrete, focused, grounded in a
shared interpretation of the recent experience,
and commensurate to the available political
capital. No grand designs – akin for example to a
new Bretton Woods-like agreement – appear
feasible or necessary at this stage. One risk is in
fact that, as the convoy of post-crisis reform
approaches its last stop at Pittsburgh, over-
ambition and conservatism, apparently battling
on opposite fronts, may reinforce each other,
weakening the outcome and producing the
essential preservation of the status quo. An even
more serious one is that attention may focus on
specifics, perhaps politically appealing, while the
broad picture is lost.
In this context it is useful to sketch a list of what
Pittsburgh may reasonably achieve.  The following
are some personal views limited to the key focal
area of financial reform, leaving out themes that,
though likely to feature in the discussions, are
relatively peripheral (for example the design of
exit strategies, or climate change). My shortlist of
potential ‘deliverables’ includes the following:
1 Restore confidence in free (but well
functioning) financial markets. The leaders’
deliberations and public communication willTHE PITTSBURGH G20 CHECKLISTIgnazio Angeloni
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signal how far governments wish to go in
broadening their command over the financial
sector. The challenge is to strengthen its
stability while preserving free and competitive
financial markets and avoiding direct micro-
management.
2 Enhance global financial governance. The
institutional changes of the last two years go
quite far in the right direction. The new
governance framework, with the G20 leaders
on top acting through their ministers, the
Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the IMF,
should be strengthened by announcing regular
meetings of the G20 leaders and establishing
a clear delegation and accountability
framework.
3 Deal with systemic risk in the financial sector.
The creation of new bodies to monitor systemic
financial risks is already underway in both
Europe and the US. The leaders can contribute
by strengthening their cross-border
consistency and the cooperation between
them and with other bodies. 
4 Reshape micro-prudential regulation. In this
very technical area leaders can contribute
predominantly by establishing or restating
broad principles and delegating, mainly to the
FSB. 
5 Create a framework to cope with global
imbalances. Large and persistent current-
account imbalances were among the factors
contributing to the crisis. There are signs that
they may rise again. Leaders should re-take the
initiative by establishing through the IMF a
framework for monitoring, preventing and
controlling the development of imbalances in
the future.
BALANCING FREE MARKET AND STATE CONTROL
After a wave of deregulation in the last quarter
century, the climate has changed: there is now
much support for a return to heavier regulation
and controls in the financial sector. Will this
happen, and where will it lead? In spite of their
complexity these questions cannot be ignored
because they are implicitly behind some key
issues to be discussed at the summit. The
challenge here is eschewing ideology and
preconceived arguments, and making sure that
any new (hopefully better) regulation is based on
a shared and sound interpretation of the recent
experience. Deliberations and communication by
the leaders will, in this respect, provide important
signals.
Two examples can help make the point. Fingers
have repeatedly been pointed at financial
derivatives, accused in general of being a means
of unproductive speculation and a source of
systemic risk. Credit default hedging instruments
were indeed a component of the rapid spread of
new risk-sharing instruments that preceded the
turmoil. What critics rarely mention is that the
predominant part of the derivative markets, those
for hedging interest-rate and exchange-rate risk,
have continued to operate smoothly throughout
the crisis despite the large and unpredicted
changes in both interest and exchange rates
during the period. These long-standing derivative
markets and their infrastructures have created no
systemic risk. Problems arose for over-the-counter
instruments such as credit default swaps and
options, subject to counterparty risk due to the
absence of central clearing arrangements. The
appropriate response is to identify ways to make
derivative instruments more transparent and
safer, eschewing indiscriminate judgements and
even more mandatory (and ineffective)
restrictions on certain instruments or
transactions. This is a technical task on which
financial regulators are at work: witness for
example the initiatives undertaken recently in the
US and under discussion in Europe to introduce for
credit risk derivative instruments the use of
central clearing counterparties and margin calls,
as in the more traditional derivative contracts. Any
opposition to these reforms from the financial
industry should be firmly resisted. 
A much more delicate issue relates to the
possibility of applying restrictions or guidelinesTHE PITTSBURGH G20 CHECKLISTIgnazio Angeloni
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on the compensation of financial managers. It is
a fact that the post-1980s deregulation was
accompanied (and perhaps, in part, caused) by a
sharp increase in managerial compensation,
everywhere but in finance particularly. Typically,
the distribution of individual rewards has been
heavily and increasingly skewed towards the
extremes. Whether this was necessary to provide
the right incentives and justified by the returns
obtained by managers for their companies is
controversial. Many believe it was not. A more
pragmatic question is how much can usefully be
achieved by top-down restrictions that, by their
nature, are crude and easy to elude. Another
approach consists in empowering the corporate
boards and other internal controls, perhaps using
internationally agreed principles as a guide – the
FSB has recently published a document on this.
Too often, administrative boards fail to exercise
sufficient scrutiny over managerial compensation
levels, either because they are captives of
management or on account of other less easily
identifiable concerns. Rewarding longer-term
corporate performance serves the company itself
by making it safer and sustainable, not only the
general public or the taxpayer; this should be more
generally understood. Financial supervisors can
monitor the decisions of corporate boards and
exercise moral suasion if needed.
These examples and other similar ones highlight
the risks of overreaction in the regulatory
response. Direct measures of compulsion are
easily circumvented, as experience demonstrates,
particularly in financial markets. But this is not
the only danger. They are also likely to weaken
individual and corporate responsibility and
accountability, the very elements that one should
strengthen. A risk manager applying a mechanical
rulebook or a financial officer subject to extensive
controls will probably, after these have been
complied with to the satisfaction of their boards,
feel less responsible for the company’s overall risk
profile. A compensation committee that has
fulfilled all legal requirements in designing its top
managers’ bonus structure, possibly using any
available loopholes, will regard all other concerns
about rewarding risk awareness as redundant.
Corporate responsibility and accountability are
essential components of a stable and smooth-
functioning financial system. They should be
fostered through all means. 
Though national regulators are ultimately
responsible in their jurisdictions, regulatory
arbitrage will tend to exert pressure towards a
similar regulatory stance. The leaders in
Pittsburgh can set the tone here. Success will
require, in this respect, striking a delicate balance
between what national constituencies demand –
often tighter or punitive regulation – and what
stands a good chance of being effective and
avoiding collateral damage. On financial reform,
deliberations and communication by the leaders
can best consist of establishing guiding principles
and objectives rather than of binding micro-
decisions. Building the appropriate incentive
structure and monitoring its performance are
tasks better left to regulators and supervisors and
their international coordination fora – mainly the
FSB, the committees of supervisors and other
standard-setting bodies. This does not exclude
(actually it requires) close control of the process
by leaders and their ministers through regular
reporting. 
ENHANCING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
The years preceding the crisis witnessed a further
acceleration of the degree of interdependence of
the international financial system. The integration
process had been in motion for decades, as is well
known, with two phenomena advancing in parallel.
First, national systems have become more
interconnected with the increased volume of
international capital flows in industrialised as well
as in emerging countries. Second, large financial
institutions (banks, institutional investors)
progressively expanded their cross-border
activities. The two processes are self- reinforcing:
on the one hand large financial institutions
operating across borders are engines of capital
flows; on the other the diversification of portfolio
holdings by households and firms requires, and
gives rise to, the presence of geographically
diversified financial players.THE PITTSBURGH G20 CHECKLISTIgnazio Angeloni
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The acceleration is not surprising in the light of
other simultaneous changes in the financial
markets. The decade preceding the crisis saw a
remarkable expansion of risk-sharing techniques
and instruments. In a way, this crisis isa crisis of
risk sharing, not in the sense that financial
diversification is harmful but that its implications
need to be better understood and controlled. A
major channel was credit derivatives. By
separating credit from other financial risks and
transforming them into separately tradable
components, credit default swaps and other
related instruments have added a new important
dimension to the geographical diversification of
risks, within and across borders. Securitisation
compounded the phenomenon by transforming
traditional retail instruments, such as mortgages
or personal loans, into widely distributed
negotiable securities. These developments have,
besides weakening bank monitoring, also
contributed to a much more interconnected
financial system (across institutions and across
frontiers).
Setting aside any self-defeating financial
protectionism, the regulatory response to these
developments should be a corresponding increase
in the cooperation among financial regulation and
supervision authorities, in different forms: from
mere information exchange among authorities
through cooperation to a sharing of objectives and
instruments. The reason is simple: financial
interdependence implies that the domestic
financial environment, shaped by national
regulation, can increasingly affect market
participants residing in other jurisdictions,
without the control of their respective regulators.
Only systematic coordination among authorities
(leading in certain respects to a single authority)
can correct for the asymmetry. The most
frequently voiced objection against close
supervisory harmonisation – that budgets for
financial rescues belong to the national taxpayer
and are ultimately governed by national politics –
loses its force in a globally integrated financial
market. Benefits and costs from last-resort
lending or other types of rescue extend to non-
residents anyway, hence the link between
supervisory responsibilities and bearing the cost
of their potential failure is severed anyway.
Virtually all recent episodes of instability or failure
of major financial institutions have involved cross-
border players. Making international supervisory
cooperation consistent with having national public
budgets requires, among other things, the
definition of mutually agreeable burden-sharing
arrangements to be applied when public support
is provided to large cross-border conglomerates.  
Remarkably, many institutional changes
occurring in the last two years have been
consistent with this reasoning. Three of them are
particularly important.
First, at an early stage of the crisis, in October
2007, the ministers and governors of the G7
decided to entrust the coordination of the crisis-
management response to an international body,
the Financial Stability forum (FSF), composed of
the financial market authorities (ministries of
finance, central banks and securities market
regulators) of the G7 countries and other
systemically relevant financial centres. Created in
the aftermath of the Russian crisis in 1998, the
FSF had for years remained a secluded forum
among financial officials, with little decision-
making or coordination ambitions. The crisis
changed its role markedly. After October 2007, the
FSF took a leading role in organising the regulatory
response to the crisis, delivering, in April 2008, a
comprehensive list of recommendations address-
ed to national and international financial
regulators. At the IMF Spring meetings of 2008,
the G7 endorsed the recommendations and asked
the FSF itself to monitor their implementation. A
new process of international financial governance,
‘On financial reform, deliberations and communication by the leaders can best consist of
establishing guiding principles and objectives rather than of binding micro-decisions. This
does not exclude (actually it requires) close control of the process by leaders.’THE PITTSBURGH G20 CHECKLISTIgnazio Angeloni
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rather technical in nature but unprecedented in
substance, was starting.
Second, after the serious aggravation of the crisis
in September 2008, the leaders of the G20
decided at the initiative of the US to convene a
meeting in Washington to discuss the situation
and formulate a shared policy response.
Extending participation to the main emerging
nations marked a historical transition from the G7
to the G20 as the centre of global financial
governance. In an unusually detailed concluding
document, the G20 leaders endorsed the
proposals of the FSF and converted it into a new
formation, the Financial Stability Board (FSB),
including the emerging nations. From then on the
FSB would report to the G20. Shortly afterwards,
a similar extension was decided for another key
international regulatory forum, the Basle
Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS),
responsible for setting minimum international
bank capital standards. 
The third development was the decision, adopted
at the following G20 leaders meeting in London
(April 2009), to strengthen the mandate and
governance and to increase the resources of the
International Monetary Fund. The IMF, which had
just completed a radical (and, one may say, rather
untimely) downsizing exercise, was given new
responsibilities in managing the macroeconomic
policy response to the crisis, in collaboration with
the FSB. The IMF was to enhance its capabilities
in analysing and monitoring financial sectors,
using its comparative advantages: country
surveillance, macroeconomic analysis, policy
advice and lending, supported by conditionality.
Seen in combination, the three steps – launch of
the FSF-FSB process, upgraded G20 and stronger
role for the IMF – amount to a significant
strengthening and rationalisation of the
international financial architecture. Legitimacy
increases because of the stronger voice and
responsibility of emerging countries at the top
(G20 leaders) and at the technical level (FSB and
the related standard-setting bodies). Account-
ability is enhanced because the three main actors
have a more consistent geometry: the IMF and the
FSB, both with broad representation, will respond
to an equally representative ‘principal’, the G20.
This contrasts with the pre-2007 situation when,
in many ways, delegation ran from the G7 to the
IMF, bodies with widely different representation.
The combination of the three should also be more
effective than in the past in view of the strong
mandate received by the FSB (in fact  before
October 2007 the FSF) in coordinating the actions
of national and international regulators.
Can this system work? Built hastily in an
emergency, will it also be effective in normal
times? Here is where political guidance will be
essential. The G20 summit should become a
regular event, with its own established working
arrangements. A key to success is in the different
roles the participants should play in the new
architecture: the leaders as ultimate source of
decision-making and (when necessary) com-
promise; the ministers in charge of monitoring
execution; and the two executive arms, FSB and
IMF, actually implementing the decisions and
ensuring the necessary cooperation at the
national level. In Pittsburgh the leaders can further
strengthen the overall structure by announcing
explicit lines of delegation to this effect.
Rules governing cooperation between the IMF and
FSB need to be built. Their structures and missions
are naturally complementary but also contain
potential overlaps and tensions. Their different
forms of organisation (the first, a supranational
organisation with a strong staff, the second an
intergovernmental body with a small technical
‘Seen in combination, the three steps – launch of the FSF-FSB process, upgraded G20 and
stronger role for the IMF – are a significant strengthening and rationalisation of the inter-
national financial architecture. But can this system – built hastily in an emergency – work?.’THE PITTSBURGH G20 CHECKLISTIgnazio Angeloni
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secretariat) and expertise (macro-policy oriented
the first, more micro prudential the second)
contain synergies. To exploit them, for each
decision or line of work the respective roles should
be clarified ex ante, based on comparative
advantage: who leads and who supports, who is
ultimately accountable and in what form. A direct
line of reporting from the two bodies to the top
level, in addition to ministers, is necessary in order
to strengthen accountability and ensure that
leaders receive all necessary technical input. 
DEALING WITH SYSTEMIC RISK
The renewed emphasis by policymakers on
‘systemic stability’ is one of the most important
consequences of the crisis. Some isolated voices
– a few academics and, notably, the economists
at the Bank for International Settlements – had
flagged the growing presence of systemic risks in
the international financial system in recent years,
offering evidence and recommendations, but the
warnings were largely ignored or underestimated.
This is changing now, opening the way to
important developments in the conduct of
prudential supervision and in its interaction with
other economic policies. The traditional macro-
policy architecture, which seemed to have
reached a stable and accepted configuration in
recent years, is evolving again. 
Systemic risk arises when actions of individual
market participants have adverse effects on the
financial system as a whole. In normal times,
financial institutions protect their balance sheet
with a variety of safeguards, voluntarily or
imposed by regulation: capital buffers, exposure
or concentration limits, free or required reserves,
and so on. Capital requirements are typically
determined on the assumptions that the rest of
the system remains stable, that asset price
volatilities are constant or predictable, and that
financial markets remain functional, so that
assets can be bought and sold in the market at all
times. The crisis has demonstrated how
implausible these assumptions are under stress.
They break down, for example, when individual
reactions – for example, fire sales of securities or
early liquidation of lending positions – generate
chain reactions by others, with negative effects on
asset prices. This is likely to happen when
markets are dysfunctional, very thin or illiquid,
perhaps due to an abnormal degree of
counterparty risk. 
One consequence of bringing systemic risk into
the picture is that the traditional boundaries
between macroeconomic policies and prudential
supervision become blurred. Instability in the
financial sector can affect the macro-economy; in
turn, macroeconomic conditions influence
financial stability by affecting bank balance
sheets. Traditionally, monetary, fiscal and
supervisory policies were designed to operate
separately and be conducted by different
authorities, each with its own specific set of
instrument and objectives. Even when the
responsibilities are reunited under a single
institution, for example when central banks
conduct banking supervision as well, the two
functions are typically carried out separately
within the same house, using different data and
models, largely by different people separated by
informational firewalls. Accounting properly for
systemic stability implies, instead, accepting a
degree of interaction and interdependence
between different policy functions. 
Another consequence relates specifically to
monetary policy. As confirmed by a growing body
of analysis, the prolonged period of monetary
expansion experienced at the global level in the
decade preceding the crisis is a factor that
contributed, among others, to the build-up of
systemic risk. Abundant liquidity and low interest
rates encourage the accumulation of leveraged
positions and excessive risk taking in the financial
sector. It is wrong to say, as some do, that
monetary policy alone (by the Fed or others)
caused the crisis. But it was surely among the
bundle of contributory factors. Risk in the financial
markets mounted during the early part of this
decade in a nearly ideal macroeconomic
environment, with high growth and stable prices.
This apparent ‘paradox’ suggests that the
traditional monetary frameworks like inflationTHE PITTSBURGH G20 CHECKLISTIgnazio Angeloni
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targeting, prescribing that central banks should
concentrate on delivering low and stable inflation
at near horizons, are not sufficient safeguards
against economic instability. Rethinking is
necessary. 
These changes in the traditional policy
architecture will only happen gradually. However,
some important institutional steps have already
been undertaken, with Europe and the US taking
the lead.
In Europe, finance ministers, endorsing the
recommendations of the high-level group chaired
by Jacques de Larosière, have decided to create a
new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) at
European Union level, with a predominance of
central bankers but open to the participation of
national and European financial authorities. The
Board will monitor developments in financial
markets from a systemic perspective, issue risk
warnings and formulate recommendations to
pertinent authorities regarding intervention
needed to maintain the stability of the EU financial
system. The Board will liaise with other competent
authorities at the global level, such as the IMF and
the FSB. After a period of preparation, the Board is
expected to begin work in the course of next year.
In the US, the Obama administration has proposed
a blueprint, currently in Congress, that includes
the creation of a new Financial System Oversight
Council, chaired by the Treasury and open to the
participation of the Fed and other main federal
financial authorities. Its tasks are comparable to
those of the ESRB, namely to identify emerging
systemic risks and the necessary policy
responses. Importantly, unlike in the EU plan, the
Fed will assume direct supervisory responsibility
over all systemically relevant financial entities.
This means that this Council will not just issue
policy recommendations but will be in a position
to execute them directly through one of its key
members, the Fed. Though the EU and the US plans
contain relevant differences, they share the
central notion of controlling for systemic risks and
assigning a key role to central banks for this
purpose.
Though the reform process in this area is already
underway, further political guidance and
mandate, also from Pittsburgh, will be useful. Two
aspects in particular deserve consideration. First,
promoting systemic stability will require strong
cooperation among authorities (central banks,
finance ministries, securities and insurance
regulators) that are accustomed, by tradition and
culture, to act autonomously and separately.
Political influence, through the proper channels,
will be necessary to bring this cooperation about.
Second, the competent national structures will
have to conduct a constant dialogue at a global
level. Systemic risk by its very nature is trans-
mitted across borders, and the responsible
institutions will not be able to operate without a
full sharing of information. A primary role for
central banks, given the multiplicity of
cooperation fora existing for related purposes,
should help this cooperation.
RESHAPING PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
The micro-prudential reform agenda is a
composite mix, with each chapter having its own
degree of complexity and controversy. Much has
already been done or is underway by regulators
and central bankers organised in several
international fora. Leaders should ideally avoid a
hands-on stance and choose instead to indicate
principles, leaving details to substructures such
as the FSB. In practice, this is unlikely to happen
completely. Banking regulation has entered the
public debate and some aspects (like managerial
compensation) have acquired symbolic value. The
relationship between banks and citizens, in their
dual role of bank customers and taxpayers, has
‘The micro-prudential reform agenda is a composite mix, with each chapter having its own
degree of complexity and controversy. Leaders should ideally avoid a hands-on stance and
choose instead to indicate principles, leaving details to substructures such as the FSB.’THE PITTSBURGH G20 CHECKLISTIgnazio Angeloni
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become strained everywhere. In this context, the
challenge for leaders will be to foster balanced
progress, ensuring that the agenda is brought
forward effectively and evenly. A danger is that the
line of least resistance be taken, with avenues
enjoying public support being pursued and others
equally important but less appealing or more
controversial lagging behind.
Financial regulators and central banks started to
coordinate early after the crisis started within the
FSF, working simultaneously on several fronts.
Since the outset, the main focus has been on
three areas: risk control (including capital
regulation, liquidity ratios and other risk control
instruments, internal risk management, etc.),
market transparency (including corporate
communication, disclosure policies, accounting
standards, the role of credit-rating agencies, etc.),
and public action to prevent and control market
risks (involving ex-antemonitoring, stress testing,
strengthening of market infrastructures, crisis
management, etc.). For each of these areas a
number of recommendations were formulated by
the FSF, endorsed by the G7 at the Spring 2008
IMF meetings. Since then the FSF has monitored
implementation, reporting periodically, and has
itself conducted work on specific issues.
Since this is a crisis originating essentially in an
excessive build-up of risk, it is not surprising that
the issue of capital adequacy and risk controls is
on top of the agenda. The consensus is now to
correct for pro-cyclicality of capital regulation,
inducing banks to accumulate capital resources
in good times, and to ensure an adequate average
capitalisation to the system as a whole. If banks
are to have an adequate capital cushion in
economic downturns (at least not worse than at
present), meeting the two requirements implies
everywhere an increase in the average rate of
capitalisation. The new bank capital standards
should achieve this outcome as soon as economic
conditions permit, encouraging subscription of
new capital from the market to the extent possible
but not excluding the public sector. Considering
that the need for recapitalisation arises in part
from the objective of containing systemic risks,
there is no reason to exclude state intervention a
priori. A similar argument applies, in particular, to
systemically relevant banks.
Recently the BCBS agreed on principles and
objectives for the new capital requirements, and
an integrated proposal should be finalised very
soon. It also agreed on specific proposals
regarding capital surcharges on certain activities
(securitisation, structured products and off-
balance sheet activities). In addition to
capital-isation, other aspects concerning bank
balance- sheet structures have revealed their
importance during the crisis. Adequate liquidity
margins, in par-ticular, can become a crucial
condition for survival in times of stress, even for
well capitalised banks, particularly if the maturity
of funding is short relative to that of other risky
assets. 
Another area where conflicts of objectives may
arise is that of accounting. Mark-to-market rules
have been recognised to be a contributor to pro-
cyclicality: write-downs during asset-price
declines can induce or force further asset sales
that may exacerbate the adverse impact on the
market. Recognising this danger, recent changes
in accounting standards in the US and elsewhere
have introduced more flexibility and discretion in
valuation policies by banks. Though temporary
and limited departures from mark-to-market may
bring relief in certain circumstances, they risk
obscuring elements of information that other
accounting methods cannot provide. They can
also discourage necessary adjustments and
cleaning-up of balance sheets.
‘Since this is a crisis originating essentially in an excessive build-up of risk, it is not surprising
that the issue of capital adequacy and risk controls is on top of the agenda. The consensus is
now to correct for pro-cyclicality of capital regulation.’THE PITTSBURGH G20 CHECKLISTIgnazio Angeloni
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In the third area, that of crisis prevention and
crisis management, significant progress has
already been achieved. In the US, the decision to
create a central counterparty for credit derivatives
should contribute to removing one of the main
elements of stress experienced during the crisis.
On ex-ante monitoring, progress is underway on
stress-testing models, though the construction
and maintenance of adequate databases for this
purpose remains a challenge. Conversely,
concrete action to mitigate the too-big-to-fail
problem, so acute recently, is still to be agreed
upon. This will require both ex-ante agreed
resolution procedures for all large systemic
financial conglomerates (‘living wills’, or ‘bank
hospitals’) and burden-sharing arrangements for
those operating cross-border. 
All in all, the main lines of action have been started
and are being implemented, by the FSB in
collaboration with other international bodies and
national authorities. In Pittsburgh and beyond, the
leaders will need to ensure full and timely
implementation. Support by ministers in monitor-
ing progress will be essential.  
A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL IMBALANCES
Among all issues recently debated in international
economics, that concerning global imbalances
has been the most vexed (and embarrassing) for
economists and policymakers. The difficulty of
dealing with the problem was matched only by
that of agreeing on its causes and consequences.
After several years of near-equilibrium, the US
current-account deficit expanded sharply in the
late 1990s and reached a peak in 2006, with
Japan, the oil exporters and China as its main
counterparties. After 2006 the problem, while
persisting, changed somewhat; a small reduction
of the US deficit was offset by a sharp rise of the
surplus of China and some others. Interestingly,
the public attention devoted to imbalances did not
develop in line with their size. As a Google search
can show, for example, the frequency of use of the
term ‘global imbalances’ was low until 2004,
peaked in 2006 around the IMF meetings and
abated thereafter, to rise again only after the
outbreak of the crisis. Right at the peak of the
phenomenon there were signs of ‘fatigue’;
imbalances seemed untreatable and perhaps,
some argued, they were not so harmful after all.
Standard international portfolio theories suggest
that current-account divergences among
countries (or areas) with independent monetary
and exchange regimes are subject to a
spontaneous self-balancing mechanism. When a
country runs a deficit, foreign portfolio holders
acquire net assets towards that country, largely
(it is normally assumed) denominated in its
currency. After a while, the reluctance of
foreigners to increase such holdings indefinitely
results in a net supply in  international financial
markets, which causes the   currency in question
to depreciate. Assuming a normal response of
trade flows to relative prices, the imbalance tends
to be reabsorbed.
This neat scheme did not work this time, because
the actors in the game (consumers, wealth-
holders, producers, policymakers) had different
objectives and priorities on the two sides. An
interest in maintaining the status quo developed
symmetrically for different reasons. The US was
able to prolong its unprecedented phase of
economic welfare based on spending, paying with
assets (dollars) it produced itself. Emerging
economic powers, such as China, could run their
supply-side economic development engine based
on exports at full speed, delaying the structural
and social changes that a transition from a
producing-only to a producing-and-consuming
society would necessitate. Oil producers, for their
part, have always had a low propensity to invest at
home. As a result, wealth holdings by surplus
emerging countries, mainly accruing to and
managed by official entities, automatically
headed back to the largest world financial market
– the US – in the form of liquid assets and
government bonds. With two consequences: the
high liquidity of international financial markets
and demand for fixed-rate securities kept interest
rates low, at both maturity ends; and as long as
the mechanism persisted, the international value
of the dollar could remain at levels incompatibleTHE PITTSBURGH G20 CHECKLISTIgnazio Angeloni
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with readjusting the imbalances. To close the
circle, cheap Asian goods converted at
undervalued exchange rates helped maintain
inflation in the US and elsewhere low and stable,
validating, in a classic inflation-targeting mindset,
the expansionary policies conducted by central
banks.
Whether one should attribute all this to
unsustainable expenditure patterns and policies
on the deficit side (read: the US) or to excessive
savings by surplus countries (China and others)
depends a little on which side of the mirror one
thinks reality is. The important point is that global
imbalances, deprived of their self-balancing
properties, needed and still need to be corrected
by policy.
In 2006, the IMF embarked on a round of
negotiations (‘multilateral consultations’) among
policymakers from the main currency areas (the
US, the euro area, China, Japan and Saudi Arabia),
with the aim of identifying the main determining
factors and agreeing on corrective policies. This
process was innovative in many ways. First, the
IMF limited participation to a few key players,
thereby enhancing efficiency. Second, the direct
involvement of the euro area (for the first time
recognised explicitly by the IMF as a fully fledged
policy actor) was a remarkable move in the right
direction. Third, the format was new in itself,
involving a sequence of bilateral (with the IMF)
and multilateral contacts leading to a set of policy
recommendations, reciprocally addressed, to
which each side would give support and
individually commit. Opinions about the success
of this exercise varied, but not for the method it
employed. What it lacked was enforcement
backed by a clear multilateral political mandate.
It would indeed be good news if the G20 in
Pittsburgh could agree on re-launching this
process on a new basis. Two novelties since 2006
make this more promising: the existence of a G20
at head-of-state level can provide a mandate and
help enforcement, and the IMF can be a stronger
leader, particularly once its governance has been
reformed. Unfortunately, action on this front does
not seem on the cards. Consensus is lacking, and
even the IMF seems to be in two minds. As a bare
minimum, global imbalances should remain a
central part of external communication by the
G20. Further preparatory work by the IMF should
be encouraged, including the elaboration of
alternative policy frameworks. 
PITTSBURGH AND BEYOND
The G20 summit is a remarkable entity: the
closest approximation ever seen in history to a
‘world governing board’. It is also the youngest
actor on the international stage. The 19 country
leaders (plus the EU) met for the first time in
Washington less than a year ago. In retrospect, it
is not obvious that the demise of Lehman Brothers
should have led, through a chain of events, to the
birth of a new international political formation
whose hallmark is the strong presence of
emerging nations. Neither the origin nor the centre
of the crisis, this time, was in the emerging world.
Yet it happened - the impending danger delivered
a quantum step forward in global financial
governance-building and reordering. The new
structure now exists and should be used, and not
lapse into being a merely formal exercise.
We opened with a warning: the Pittsburgh
meeting, taking place while the global economy is
re-emerging from the most acute phase of the
crisis, may well represent a final opportunity to
move forcefully in the direction of international
financial reform. We discussed five possible lines
of action, defined as the intersection of what
should be done to draw positive lessons from the
experience and what can be done, given the
degree of consensus existing at national and
international level.
These actions require sustained commitment and
effort; this is why, above all, strengthening the
new institutional architecture is important.
Transforming the Pittsburgh event from an
endpoint to the start of a process is, in a nutshell,
the challenge which G20 leaders must meet.